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This paper  examines  the  impact  of federal  fiscal-  Cost-Price  Impacts
monetary (FM) policy on farm structure.  FM policy is
multifaceted but is confined here mainly to policies in-  Prices throughout  the economy do not change lock-
fluencing aggregate demand.  Inflation is defined  as an  step in response to expansionary fiscal-monetary  pol-
increase  in the  general price level.  Farm structure re-  icy.  Imperfectly  competitive  sectors  characterized  by
fers to farm size and numbers,  tenure,  legal organiza-  administered  or negotiated prices  might more quickly
tion, investment, capital-labor ratio, productivity, and  and  fully  pass  inflated  costs to other sectors  than  do
status (part-time  or full-time farming).  atomistically competitive sectors such as farming.  On
The organization  of this paper reflects that FM pol-  the  other  hand,  wage  and  other contracts  in  imper-
icy  primarily  impacts  farm  structure  indirectly.  The  fectly  competitive  industries might cause prices  charged
immediate  or first-round impact on the farming indus-  by  firms  in  such  industries  to rise  more  slowly  than
try  is  primarily  through  cost-price,  cash  flow,  real  other prices.  Inventories,  biological  restraints,  supply
wealth,  and  instability  effects.  I examine these  first-  and  demand elasticities,  and  other factors also  influ-
round  effects  before  analyzing  their impacts  on  farm  ence  the  relative  and  absolute  response of prices  by
structure.  The final  section briefly  reviews the  influ-  sector  to an  expansion  in aggregate  demand.  Theory
ence of federal tax policies on farm structure.  alone cannot predict relative  price response  by indus-
try; the issue is empirical.  The focus here is on the re-
sponsiveness  of  prices  received  and  prices  paid  by
FIRST-ROUND  IMPACTS  farmers to an increase in the general price level.
The conceptual  framework  was developed in a pre-
Fiscal  policy  and monetary  policy working in con-  vious study (Tweeten  1980a)  relating farm prices  to the
cert  have created  an  inflation  cycle.  Stimulating  the  general price level.  My earlier empirical estimates  in-
aggregate  demand  by  increasing  money  supply  and  dicating that prices received by farmers change in pro-
federal  outlays and/or reducing  taxes gives rise to the  portion to  the general  price level are  supported by other
expansionary phase of the inflation  cycle apparent in  studies  (see Gardner).  However,  my earlier estimates
increased employment,  income,  inflation,  and net im-  showing  that prices paid by farmers change relatively
ports.  Contracting the aggregate  demand by reducing  more than the general price level are disputed by other
money supply  and federal  spending and/or expanding  studies (see Gardner).  To help resolve the issue, I here
taxes  creates  the  stabilization  phase of the  inflation  present  new  estimates  for  the  impact of inflation  on
cycle apparent in reduced employment, income,  infla-  prices paid.
tion, and net imports.  In general,  imports of FM policy  The economic  model  is  the  input  supply  equation
can be analyzed  by phases  of the  inflation  cycle fea-  specified as
turing  these joint  outcomes.  Most  of the  subsequent
analysis  proceeds  on  that  basis.  However,  in recent  (1)  Pt  =  f(Q,,  Ut, Ct,  Mt,  D,, PGt, PGt-,, .... )
years  fiscal  policy  and  monetary  policy  working  at
cross-purposes  have produced mixed outcomes,  com-  where
plicating the analysis of impacts. Fiscal-monetary  pol-
icy will be treated briefly  on an ad hoc basis.  Pt  =  Index of prices  paid by farmers for produc-
Much of the following discussion  is oriented to the  tion  inputs  including  interest,  taxes,  and
expansion  phase,  but  the  arguments  regarding  cost-  wage  rates.  The  index  of  prices  paid  by
price,  cash flow,  real wealth,  and instability are  largely  farmers  for  items  of  nonfarm  origin,  PPt,
symmetric  for the  stabilization  phase-if disinflation  available  only for the  1965-81  period,  was
does not turn into deflation,  pessimism into panic, and  alternatively used as the dependent variable.
recession  into depression.  Q,  = Index of aggregate farm production  inputs.
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61Ut =  National unemployment rate.  (2)  PG*t  =  go PGt  +  glAPGt
Ct  =  Capacity  utilization  rate  in U.S.  manufac-  =  (go  +  g)PG  - g  PGt1.
turing.
Dt  =  Dummy  variable;  each  year  with a higher  After  inserting this expectation  model for PGt  and
inflation rate than the previous  year =  1, and  PC t into equation  (1),  the resulting  ordinary  least
all other years equal  zero.  squares estimates of input supply for the  1948-81  pe-
PGt  =  Implicit  price  deflator  index  of the  Gross  riod are
National Product. The consumer price index  (2a)  P,  =  -69.14  +  .61Q, +  2.35PG  - 1.94G,,  +  .64P,,  R
2
=  .998
PCt was  alternatively  used as  a measure of th  ges ealt  pria  vel.y  used(asa  e(s.e.)  (35.15)  (.32)  (.31)  (.34)  (.11)  DWh  = 1.14 the general price level.
(Pr>t)  (.06)  (.07)  (<.01)  (<.01)  (<.01)  Rho  =  .15
Each index  was expressed  as  a percent  of its  1967  (2b)  P,  =  21.95  +  .19Q, +  1.52PC,-  .19PC,  + .69P,  R=  .997
value.  Data  were  annual  observations  from  1948  toe.)  (35.09)  (.32)  (.26)  (.31)  (.16)  DWh7.07
1981,  unless  otherwise  indicated,  and were  from the
^~~~~~~~~~~(Pr>t)  (.54)  (.57)  (<.01)  (<.01)  (<.01)  Rho=  .35
Council of Economic  Advisors  and the U.S.  Depart-
ment of Agriculture.  All coefficients display expected signs.  Judging by
Inflation  might  impact  on  farm prices  differently,  the  R2, insignificant  autocorrelation  coefficient  in
depending  on whether inflationary  pressures (vali-  equation (2a) and the magnitudes of the coefficients on
dated by an increase in money supply) come from de-  PG and PC,  the specification of equation  (2) is supe-
mand-pull,  cost-push,  structural  friction,  or other  rior to that of equation (1).  A  1-percent increase in the
sources.  Accordingly,  equation  (1)  includes  the  de-  general price level is associated with a 1.5- to 2.4-per-
gree of excess manufacturing  capacity in the economy  cent increase in prices paid by farmers in the short run
as measured by C,, wage-price inflationary pressure as  and by a 1.06- to 1.14-percent increase in the long run
measured  by  Ut,  and  demand-led  inflationary  pres-  with elasticities computed  at 1967  means.  The coeffi-
sures originating from an increase  in money supply, Mt.  cients of PGt and PCt are significantly greater than 1.0.
Coefficients of these variables were statistically insig-  The implied existence  of a real  farm-price  impact  of
nificant,  either  singly or interacting  with  the general  inflation in the  short run but none  in the long run is a
price level,  hence the variables  were excluded  in sub-  more plausible result than that of equation (1).
sequent  empirical  equations.  The  coefficients  of  Because Qt contributes  to multicollinearity  and be-
dummy variable Dt and of another dummy variable al-  cause its coefficients  were not significant in equation
lowing for a change in the intercept for the last half of  (2)  and were  much  less  significant  in  equations  for
the  1948-81 estimation period were also insignificant,  shorter time periods,  the input supply  equation omit-
and the variables  were removed from the equation.  ting Qt is shown for various time periods in Table 1 as
The wage rate (along with Ut to represent labor mar-
kets) and other prices,  such as for energy, could be in-  Table 1.  Farm Input Supply Equations Estimated by
cluded  in equation  (1)  with  a two-step process  to  Ordinary  Least  Squares,  U.S.  Annual  Data  for  Se-
estimate  these  input  prices  as  a  function  of  general  lected Time Periods with Pt Dependent.
prices to record the impact of inflation on P,.  This pro-
I.•  f  f  L i  f i  ndependn  nt  _____________  Equation  Number  (and  Period)
cedure was rejected in favor of the "reduced  form.  eee  Equation  Number and  Period) Variables  3  c  3d  3e  3f
A Nerlove-type  adjustment  model relating the gen-  - __1(1948-81)  (1948-81)  (1948-64)  (1948-64)  (1965-81)  (1965-81)
eral price level to prices paid by farmers produced  the  Intercept  -2.21  -1.82  7.85  5.32  -21.50  .64
(s.e.)  (3.45)  (3.83)  (6.19)  (5.35)  (14.87)  (11.22)
following  ordinary  least squares equations fitted to U.S.  (Pr  > t)  (.53)  (.64)  (.23)  (.34)  (.17)  (.96)
annual data for the  1948-81  period.
PGt  2.34  2.03  2.31
(s.e.)  (.33)  (.35)  (.55)
(Pr  > t)  (<.01)  (<.01)  (<.01)
(la)  P,  =  -144.31  +  1.18Q,  +  .76PG,  +  .54P,-,  R
2
=  .996
(s.e.)  (46.26)  (.43)  (.19)  (.15)  DWh  =  4.89**  PGt-1  -2.15  -1.76  -1.67
(Pr>t)  (<.01)  (.01)  (<.01)  (<.01)  Rho  =  .36  ()  (.34)  (.39)  (.7)
(lb)  P,  =  -85.76  +  .67Q,  +  .74PC,  +  .46P,-,  R
2
=  .995  (Pr  > t)  (<.01)  (<.01)  (.03)
(s.e)  (37.26)  (.36)  (.20)  (.18)  DWh  =  Indet.
(Pr>t)  (.03)  (.07)  (<.01)  (.02)  Rho  =  .34  PCt  1.52  1.45  1.46
(s.e.)  (.26)  (.21)  (.46)
(Pr  >  t)  (<.01)  (<.01)  (.01)
Several  problems  are apparent in the specification.
First-order autocorrelation of residuals is indicated by  PCt-1  -1.26  -1.10  -1.27
(s.e.)  (.28)  (.28)  (.57) Rho and  the highly  significant  Durbin-Watson  h  sta-  (Pr  >  t)  (<.01)  (.01)  (.05)
tistic  in equation  (la),  and  determinate  h  in equation
Pt-1  .80  .75  .61  .57  .53  .81 (lb).  Both equations  display  expected  coefficient  signs,  (.e.)  (.08)  (.13)  (.17)  (19)  (.22)  (.26)
but the  magnitudes  are  suspect.  The elasticities  of P  (Pr  >t)  (<.01)  (<.01)  (<.01)  (<.01)  (.03)  (.01)
with respect to PG or PC are expected to be near 1.0 in  R2  .998  .997  .951  .956  .997  .995
the long run, but are 1.65 for equation (la) and 1.37 for  Dwh
a .39  2.74**  -. 07  -. 04  1.41  Indet.
(lb).  A more flexible specification is desired, allowing  Rho  .06  .32  -. 09  -. 06  .15  .34
-c,~~  -J'.^-J-  ~  .•  .i  ~  ,i~  - ,  ~~  ^~  lLong-run  Elast.  .95  1.04  .69  .81  1.36  1.00 for differential  short-run impacts of PG and PC on Pt.  _ _._u
Hence, the expectation of PG*, is expressed  as a func-  Double asterisk denotes significance at  .01  probability level.
tion of the level and change in PGt:
62equations  (3a)-(3-f).  Coefficient  signs  and  signifi-  Table 2.  Prices  Paid by  Farmers  Pt  Estimated as  a
cance levels  are favorable;  autocorrelation  is not a se-  Function of the General Price Level by Ordinary Least
rious problem,  and R2's are high. Results  are broadly  Squares  and Polynomial  Distributed Lag,  Annual  U.S.
consistent among time periods,  indicating that higher  Data.
inflation  rates  and energy-price  increases  in the  later
period did  not  markedly  change  short-  and long-run  vEquation  Number  (and  Period)
Variable  v4a  4b  5a  5b  6a  6b elasticities of P with respect to the general price level.  a  e  (1948-81)  (1948-81)  (1950-81)  (1950-81)  (1950-81)  (1950-81)
An even greater short-term impact of general infla-  Intercept  -19.89  -14.26  -5.79  -12.46  -4.36  -13.15
tion is  apparent  with PPt,  prices paid  by  farmers  for  (s.e.)  (6.44)  (4.69  (8.71)  (8.04)  (8.75)  (9.00)
items of nonfarm origin, as the dependent variable.  In  PG(PC)at  3.77  2.12  3.80  2.49  2.82  1.67
equation counterparts to those in Table 1 for the  1965-  (s.e.)  (.64)  (.35)  (.69)  (.47)  (.40)  (.27)
81  period,  with PP, dependent,  the coefficient was 3.02  PG(PC)t-1  2.59  .99  -2.36  -2.09  -. 32  -. 28
for PGt and  1.85 for PCt.  (s.e.)  (.72)  (.40)  (1.30)  (.88)  (.36)  (.24)
The  high  correlation  between  current  and  lagged
i  _r  i  1  *  . - .i  * ..  PG(PC)t-2  1.40  1.49  -. 75  -. 33 values  of the general  price level  might  cause  coeffi-  (s.e.)  (1.33)  (.97)  (.31)  (.20)
cient  instability  and inflate  standard  errors.'  Several
approaches  were used to ascertain  the impact of mul-  PG(PC)t-3  -1.90  -.79  -.005  .34
(s.e.)  (.79)  (.58)  (.29)  (.20) ticollinearity.  It is notable that coefficients from equa-
tions estimated with first differences  of the general price  PG(PC)t-4  .35  .55
level and hence  with minimal correlations  among in-  (e.)  (.36)  (.24)
dependent  variables  fell  between  absolute  values  of  PG(PC)t-5  -1.20  -.86)
coefficients of the lagged  and current  values in equa-  (s.e.)  (.41)  (.29)
tions (2)  and (3).  (First difference equations  force the  R2  .989  .994  .992  .994  .994  .995
long-term elasticity to zero and are not shown.)  Equa-  DWdb  .50  .48  .56  .66  .72  .74
tions in Table 1 were also estimated with real prices (Pt/  Rho  .73  .73  .71  .66
Long-run  Elast.  1.18  1.13  .94  1.10  .90  1.09
PGt  and  Pt/PCt)  as  dependent  to reduce  multicollin-_____________________
earity.2 R2's were  lower,  but interpretations  were un-
changed-inflation significantly raises real prices paid  Equations  numbered  with  a "b"  have  PC independent.  Variables  are defined  in  the
by farmers  in the short run.  b  All Durbin-Watson  d statistics are significant at the .01  level.
Additional  equations  were estimated  to further ex-
plore  the  impact  of multicollinearity  and coefficient
behavior  under  alternative  lag  structures  (Table  2).  1967 mean and shown in the  last row of Table  1, are
Equations (4) and (5)  were estimated by ordinary least  not much  different from the anticipated  value of 1.0.
squares,  with respectively  two and four general price  Considering  all plausible  specifications  and  all  time
level  variables.  Equations were  also estimated with a  periods evaluated,  no basis exists to reject the hypoth-
third degree polynomial  and general price level lag of  esis that  inflation has  a short-run real price impact on
four years and  of six years.  The polynomial equation  the farming industry through prices paid by farmers.
results  for  the  four-year  lag  were  nearly  identical  to  Even if prices paid by farmers increase  more than the
those  from  ordinary  least  squares  equation  (5),  and  general price level in the short run, the ratio of prices
hence are not shown. Results of the third-degree poly-  received,  P' to prices paid by farmers will not decline
nomial  with a six-year lag are shown in equation (6).  if P' is  as responsive as P to general prices.  In an ear-
Based  on  signs  and significance  of regression  and  lier study  (Tweeten  1980a),  I concluded that the elas-
first-order  autocorrelation  coefficients,  results  in Ta-  ticity of P'  with  respect  to PG  was  not significantly
ble 2 are inferior to those in Table 1. However, the im-  different from  1.0. Using coefficients  from equations
portant  point  is that  a broad  range  of  specifications  (3a)  or (3e),  the implication is that each  1-percent in-
support  the  conclusion  that  inflation  increases  real  crease in PG reduces the parity ratio by 2.3  - 1.0  =
prices paid by farmers-all coefficients of PGt and PC,  1.3 percent  in the  short run.  Equations using the con-
in Table 2 are significantly  greater than  1.0.  sumer price  index to  measure the  general  price level
All of the  coefficients  of PGt and  PC, in equations  give lower elasticity estimates of P with respect to PC.
(2),  (3a)-(3e),  (4),  (5),  and (6) significantly exceed  1.0,  The elasticity of prices received P'  with respect to PC
indicating prices  paid by  farmers  increase  more  than  was not estimated in my earlier study, but would prob-
the  general  price  level  in the  short run.  The  "over-  ably be lower than  the elasticity of P'  with respect to
reaction"  to inflation  is mostly  offset after one  year,  PG and hence less than  1.0. The ratio of the two elas-
and most of the long-term elasticities,  computed at the  ticities might be similar to that between coefficients of
I Correlation coefficients  among interdependent variables are:
PGt-  1 PCt  PCt-_  Pt-I  Qt
PGt  .9976  .9976  .9976  .9912  .2668
PGt-  l  .9956  .9978  .9896  .2541
PC  .9986  .9958  .3121
PC,t-  .9952  .3002
Pt- I  .3603
2 The specification  with Pt/PGt  (or P,/PC,) and Q, dependent was also estimated jointly with  an input demand  equation by three-stage  least squares. The coefficient  of Q,  in the input supply
equation was insignificant,  indicating no need for joint estimation of input price and quantity  in a simultaneous system.  (It may be  noted that equations  with deflated  values Pt dependent  also
included deflated  lagged  values of the same variable  as independent  to form the distributed lag model.)
63PG, and  PC, in Table 1. Thus, estimates of inflation's  "paper"  profits  difficult  to confiscate  in case  of de-
impact on the  ratio P'/P might not be changed appre-  fault. Thus, inflation raises immediate costs and defers
ciably by using PC rather than PG as a measure of the  returns.
general  price  level.  Some of the  specifications  noted  Cash flow  influences  investment.  High rates of in-
earlier provide even larger values for the real price ef-  flation tilt net cash flow toward  large deficits in early
fect of inflation on the farming industry.  years and large surpluses in later years of the farm firm
Which  estimate  of the general price level,  PG or PC,  life cycle  (Tweeten  1981 b).  This promotes high aver-
is preferred?  The advantage of PG,  the implicit defla-  age rates  of savings  and  investment  because  it forces
tor of GNP,  is its comprehensive coverage of goods and  high investment rates to survive in early years and en-
services.  The advantage of PC, the consumer price in-  courages high savings  rates out of large discretionary
dex,  is that  it, like P,  is  a modified Laspeyres  index.  cash surplus  in later years.
Laspeyres indices  overestimate  general price changes
in an inflationary  economy.  Biases are somewhat off-  Real Wealth Impacts
setting in estimating  the impact on P of PC but not of
PG. However,  both PG and PC indicate  that inflation  In the past, farmers benefited greatly from inflation
generates  unfavorable  short-run real price impacts on  because they were net debtors who incurred long-term
the farm economy.  interest obligations at rates well below the subsequent
Other investigators found no evidence that inflation  inflation  rate.  The  requirement  for  such  real  wealth
reduces  real  farm prices (see  Gardner).  While  I  con-  gains is that inflation be unanticipated by lenders, that
sider my  estimates convincing  based on theoretical  and  long-term  mortgages  be  contracted  at  fixed  interest
applied  grounds,  I  will  let  more  unbiased  observers  rates,  and  that  farmers  be  net debtors.  Future  real-
judge which results are most plausible.  wealth gains are unlikely to approach levels of the pre-
Finally,  it may be noted that a dummy variable al-  1980s.  Creditors  "burned"  badly  by real-wealth losses
lowing different responses of farm prices to falling and  in the past are  unlikely to repeat their mistakes;  they
rising inflation rates  had  an  insignificant  coefficient,  will lend either at high fixed interest rates or at flexible
suggesting that responses of P are symmetric for rising  rates  tied  to  inflation.  There  is  no  reason  to  expect
and falling general prices.  debtors  to be  any  wiser than  creditors  in consistently
anticipating future inflation and thereby accruing real-
Cash-Flow  Impacts  wealth  gains.
A second source of real-wealth  gains prior to 1980
I  have  elsewhere  (Tweeten  1981b)  developed  the  was  land  earnings  increasing  faster than  earnings  on
theory of the impact of inflation  on cash flow in farm-  other investments.  As  owners  of two-thirds of farm-
ing  and  will  only briefly  review  the  issue here.  The  land,  farmers benefited  massively not only from land
fundamental  theorem is that over time the current rate  earnings  but also from resulting real land price appre-
of return on a durable resource  such as farmland is in-  ciation.  Since  1980,  the situation has reversed with land
variant to  inflation.  Empirical  evidence  supports  this  earnings and prices  falling and farm owners incurring
theory;  the current rate of return on farmland has tended  real-wealth  losses.  Real prices for farm output are ex-
to average approximately  4 percent, whether the infla-  pected to increase somewhat from  1982 to 2000,  rais-
tion rate is high or low.  ing land  earnings,  land prices,  and  real wealth gains.
Because real estate accounts  for 80 percent of farm  The source of these increases will be mainly Marshal-
assets, the implication for farmers of this fundamental  lian  supply-demand  factors,  rather  than  government
theorem  is profound.  If land earnings  keep pace  with  fiscal-monetary policy.
inflation,  as they have historically  (with some notable
exceptions  such as the early  1980s),  and if land prices  Instability Impacts
average  approximately 25  times earnings as in the past,
then capital  gain can be expected to compensate land-  Flexible interest rates increasingly used to cope with
owners for inflation. The cash-flow problem arises be-  the inflation cycle reduce chances  for real-wealth
cause capital gain is unrealized until land is sold, while  transfers between debtor and creditor and, like flexible
mortgage interest rates rather swiftly sum to the real rate  exchange rates,  reduce the incidence of major long-term
of interest  (about 3 percent) plus the premium for ex-  economic  shocks  to  the  farming  economy.  But  like
pected inflation.  Thus, if no inflation  is anticipated,  the  flexible  exchange  rates,  flexible  interest rates  proba-
current farmland return of 4 percent and  mortgage in-  bly increase  short-term economic  instability in farm-
terest at a similar rate create  no cash-flow  problem on  ing.  Short-term  instability  of interest  rates  is further
a perpetual mortgage.  But with expected inflation of 9  aggravated  by the Federal Reserve Board policy,  dat-
percent,  the current  return on  farmland  remains  at 4  ing from October  1979,  of attempting to  stabilize
percent, while mortgage interest rate rises to 3 +  9  =  money  supply  rather than  interest rates in the face  of
12 percent,  creating a cash-flow  deficit of 12  - 4  =  fluctuating  demand for money.  Uncertainty  about fu-
8  percent  of land  values.  A  capital  gain of 9 percent  ture  inflation  rates raises  long-term relative  to short-
eventually compensates  so that returns of 4  +  9  =  13  term  interest  rates,  encouraging  use  of short-term  fi-
percent  cover  interest  costs.  In  theory,  landowners  nancial  capital  and discouraging  long-term capital in-
could  borrow  on capital  gains to cover  the cash-flow  vestments.
deficit,  but creditors  are hesitant to lend on uncertain  Other costs of inflation  and instability  arising from
64the inflation cycle can be listed (Tweeten and Griffin).  the U.S.  create high interest rates elsewhere,  contrib-
The inflation cycle arbitrarily redistributes income and  uting to a foreign financial  crisis.  Trade wars  and pro-
wealth,  creating  social  friction.  Real  capital  invest-  tectionist  policies  also  attend  the  poorly  performing
ments tend to be attractive in the expansion phase and  U.S.  and world economies.
financial capital  in the stabilization phase of the infla-  Empirical  analysis  indicates that farmers  have a high
tion cycle.  Costs are incurred in shifting funds among  propensity to invest out of transitory income,  which is
financial  investments,  real  capital  investments,  and  large in an unstable economic environment.  Empirical
cash balances.  Taxes on nominal  interest and  capital  models of the permanent income hypothesis applied to
gains  distort incentives.  The optimal resource level  and  farming reveal  that investment  is greater  with an un-
mix for given  inflation  expectations  become subopti-  stable  than  with  a stable  income,  other things  being
mal when actual inflation rates turn out to be different  equal.  An unstable  economic  environment  generates
than anticipated.  excess  capacity  in  peak  income  and  production  pe-
Whatever its intentions,  the Federal Reserve has in  riods, which remains underutilized in slack periods be-
fact pursued  an erratic policy,  contributing  to the in-  cause  it is specialized  to agriculture.  An unstable
flation cycle by increasing money supply at a pace that  economic  environment  requires resources  for risk
generates unacceptable inflation, then reducing money  avoidance strategies,  such as hedging, forecasting,  di-
supply  to  generate  unacceptable  recession.  The  do-  versifying,  storing,  renegotiating  contracts,  revising
mestic income effect of this inflation cycle on the farm  prices,  and managing  liquidity,  that would not be
economy is less than in the past because of the low in-  needed in a stable environment.
come elasticity of demand for food,  but is severe for  The net effect on resource use  and efficiency  of in-
the beef sector,  which supplies  a product  with a rela-  appropriate  and unstable fiscal-monetary  policy aver-
tively  high  income  elasticity  of demand.  Income  of  aged  over  inflation  cycles  can  be  judged  only
farmers is also affected by the inflation cycle because  imperfectly.  My conclusion  is that instability reduces
they  depend  increasingly  on  off-farm job  earnings,  economic efficiency (Tweeten 1979, Chapter 7).  Insta-
which  are buffeted by fluctuating  employment  oppor-  bility  may  increase  investment  and  aggregate  input
tunities  through the inflation cycle.  volume, but may reduce output.
Impacts  of the inflation cycle are also influenced by
growing  international  linkages.  The expansion  phase
of the cycle is characterized by increasing imports and  IMPLICATIONS  FOR  FARM  SIZE
decreasing exports induced by rising domestic  income  AND  TYPE
and prices relative to other countries.  In time this trade
imbalance may be redressed by a declining value  of the  The analysis now turns to implications of fical-mon-
dollar in  foreign exchange  and  by  foreign economic  etary  policy  for farm size  and  type through  the cost-
growth induced by economic  growth in the U.S. Both  price,  cash flow, real wealth,  instability, and other in-
of the latter force  increases in U.S. exports.  termediaries  discussed  above.  Future real-wealth
Unfavorable  fiscal-monetary  policy may  weaken  the  transfers  may  be small,  hence  they  are omitted.  The
economic  performance  of nonfarm industries  more than  cost-price phenomenon primarily impacts on structure
of the farming industry. The result may be a declining  through instability,  interacting with the inflation cycle
value of the dollar in world markets, but a relative ad-  to accentuate  farm price instability. The following dis-
vantage  for  U.S.  agriculture,  apparent  in  rising real  cussion  focuses primarily on the impact of instability
farm prices and exports.  Again the inflation cycle cre-  and cash flow  on farm structure with particular atten-
ates instability through this linkage.  tion to competitive advantage of (1) entry-level versus
If fiscal policy  and monetary  policy work at cross-  established  farmers,  (2)  renters  versus  owner-opera-
purposes,  as in the  1980s,  other consequences  of the  tors,  (3)  industrial-conglomerate  corporate farms  ver-
inflation cycle follow.  A contractionary monetary pol-  sus  family  farms,  and  (4)  part-time  versus  full-time
icy coupled with an expansionary fiscal  policy makes  operators.  Each  situation  will  be evaluated under  fa-
federal government  deficit financing a strong compet-  vorable  versus  unfavorable  fiscal-monetary  policies
itor for financial  capital, driving up real estate interest  with the former defined as one providing high employ-
rates.  Interest rates are also raised in an uncertain and  ment  and consistent  economic  growth  under a  stable
unstable economic environment because financial cap-  general price level.
ital  suppliers  demand  a risk premium.  Fear  that  the
Federal Reserve will not hold to tight-money policy in  Entry Versus Established Family Farmers
the  face  of unemployment  and  large federal  deficits
creates  expectations  of future inflation  that add to the  In the past, a major advantage of the family farm has
interest charge.  High real interest  rates retard  invest-  been its capacity to withstand economic  instability.  The
ment,  employment,  and  economic growth  in the  do-  farm family did so by supplying a considerable portion
mestic economy,  while attracting  financial  capital  from  of farm equity,  labor, and management resources.  The
abroad.  The reduced supply  of dollars  abroad  raises the  family  would  survive  economic  adversity  by  "tight-
value of the dollar in foreign exchange,  depressing farm  ening  its belt,"  accepting  low  returns  to owned  re-
and nonfarm U.S.  exports.  The weak U.S.  economy  sources,  and  foregoing  expenditures  while  awaiting
imports  less and depresses  foreign economies,  which  better times.  With  rising asset requirements  and  cash
in turn import less from the U.S. High interest rates in  costs  for an  economic  size  unit,  the  full-time  family
65farm is less able to do so. Established  farmers who have  valued at opportunity costs.  The number of small units
accumulated considerable equity and a favorable debt-  operated by able-bodied,  full-time farmers has dimin-
asset ratio can still do so, but not the highly  leveraged  ished sharply.  Part-time small farms are economically
beginning farmer faced with the cash-flow squeeze en-  viable  and growing  in numbers.  Many  families value
gendered by inflationary fiscal-monetary policy.  High  highly  the farm way  of life and  are willing to pay  for
inflation  does  not  affect  farm  firm  growth  substan-  this consumption preference  by subsidizing small farm
tially,  but  severely  impairs  entry of prospective  full-  residency out of nonfarm income. These consumptive
time family farmers (Eginton and Tweeten).  As estab-  part-time  small farmers  can cope with cash-flow  and
lished family farmers compete effectively against pro-  instability problems by using nonfarm  income to sup-
spective  family  farmers  for  opportunities,  farm  plement farm income.  They are further encouraged by
structure is  tilted to larger, fewer units in an unfavor-  taxation  policies and subsidized rural community  ser-
able macroeconomic policy environment,  vices  to be farm residents.  Surveys  indicate that part-
time farming is a widely perferred "permanent"  activ-
Renters Versus  Owner-Operators  ity;  such  farmers  for  the  most  part  are  positioning
Cash-flow  problems  in agriculture  arise primarily  themselves  neither to become full-time farmers nor to
from buying land.  With a given equity,  an operator can  become  nonfarm  residents.  Life-cycle  historic  data
withstand  cash-flow  and  instability  problems  arising  from a survey in Oklahoma suggest that small farm op-
from  unfavorable  fiscal-monetary  policies  or other  erators  started  small,  and full-time  commercial  farm
sources  better as a renter rather than an owner. An ab-  operators  started somewhat  large. Thus,  part-time  small
sentee landlord  servicing a mortgage  out of a medical  farms  and  full-time  large  family  farms  seem  to  be
practice  or other nonfarm income  can deal  with  cash  somewhat  distinct  entities  with relatively  few  cross-
flow  and instability  problems more readily  than can a  overs between the two.  Given the barriers to new full- flow  and instability  problems more readily  than can a
full-time farm owner-operator  depending  on the farm  time operations, the desire for farm residence,  and the
for  income.  It follows  that  unfavorable  fiscal-mone-  success of part-time small farmers in coping with cash- for  income.  It follows  that  unfavorable  fiscal-mone-  flow and instability problems associated with unfavor- tary policy tilts  land ownership  to absentee  landlords  flo  an  instability problems associated with unfavor-
and  to  farm operator  tenancy  and  part-ownership.  A  able  fiscal-monetary  policy,  the number of part-time
decrease  in the proportion of farmland owned by farm  small farms i  expected to increase relative to full-time
operators is  expected.  family farm operations.
Corporate Industrial-Conglomerate
Versus Family Farms  TAX  POLICY
Farms with diversified  sources of farm and nonfarm  This paper has emphasized federal  fiscal-monetary
income and debt and equity capital can withstand cash-  policy as it affects aggregate demand and general price
flow and instability problems better than can full-time  level. The specific form of federal spending and taxing
family farmers who depend on farm income.  The cor-  policies  also affects  structure. Federal income and es-
porate  conglomerate  avoids  the  life  cycle  financial  tate taxes appear  to influence  farm structure  much more
problems  of the family farm.  Ever larger asset and cash  than  other major programs,  such as federal  credit and
cost  requirements  per dollar  of farm  output coupled  commodity  programs.
with  marketing  economies  on  larger  operations  and  Other things equal,  progressive  income  and  estate
advantages  of  highly  sophisticated  technology  (e.g.  taxes  would discourage  growth of large farms.  Other
computers)  and risk management  strategies also make  things are not equal,  however. Progressivity of federal
conglomerate  farms effective competitors with family  taxes  has been offset by tax  credits and deductions over
farms.  A chief advantage of family farmers-devoted,  considerable income ranges (Sisson). A central feature
high-quality  operational  management  and  husbandry  of income tax credits  and deductions is that they  sub-
coupled with willingness to temporarily postpone con-  sidize capital, while payroll taxes increase costs of la-
sumption or accept lower average real return on owned  bor-thus  the  tax  system  encourages  substitution  of
resources  over time-is  probably  relatively  less  im-  capital  for labor (Boehlje; Davenport, et al.; Eginton).
portant now than in the past for survival.  Coping with  Tax  deductions  interact  with  inflation  and  income,
the inflation cycle has hastened the development of so-  giving a comparative advantage in bidding for farm re-
phisticated risk management  strategies and negotiated  sources to investors with high incomes.  With land the
or administered pricing in agriculture characterized  by  major capital  input in farming,  the implication is  that
economies for large farm firms.  Thus unfavorable  fis-  federal  income taxes  bring about larger, fewer farms.
cal-monetary policy abets the trend to market concen-  Tax  laws encourage  expansion  of individual farm firms
tration and away from atomistic  competition.  Although  and exert upward pressure on land prices, creating  bar-
the pace  of conglomerate encroachment  into farming  riers to farm entry.
will probably be  slow  at any rate,  unfavorable  fiscal-  Recent  federal  tax law  has essentially removed es-
monetary policy quickens the pace.  tate taxes on transfer of an economic  size farming unit
Part-time Versus Full-time  Operators  among  generations.  Based on simulations of a typical
commercial  Oklahoma  farm,  if an owner-operator  with
Small farming  operations  produce  less  efficiently  on  minimum initial equity died after 30 years of farming,
the  average  than  larger farms,  when  all resources  are  he could leave double his initial real equity to each of
66two heirs,  along with a lifetime annuity to his spouse  nology (Tweeten  1980b,  p.  117).  Farms must grow in
(Eginton). If each of the two heirs had spouses who re-  scale for farm income to keep pace with rising income
ceived  similar inheritance,  the implications  for accu-  of nonfarmers.  Favorable  fiscal-monetary  policy causes
mulation  of farm assets among generations  and eventual  income  and technology  growth,  resulting  in  fewer,
growth into larger-than-family-size  farms  is apparent.  larger farms. Thus there may be fewer farms on the av-
Many federal tax provisions are available only in farm-  erage  with  favorable  fiscal-monetary  policy,  but the
ing and  have the greatest value  for persons  with high  impact of unfavorable  policy is to push the  composi-
wealth  and  income,  thus tilting farm  structure  in the  tion of those farms  away from the family ideal of full-
same direction as the unfavorable fiscal-monetary pol-  time owner-operator units that allow the family to make
icy discussed above. Tax laws especially disadvantage  most of the decisions and supply most of the labor and
potential young operators  who are not sons or sons-in-  equity capital.
law of established operators.  The behavioral  responses of aggregate  farm  struc-
ture  to federal  fiscal-monetary  policy have  not been
CONCLUSIONS  quantified,  necessitating  a treatment  herein largely
based on  deductive logic.  The logic receives  support
Unfavorable  fiscal-monetary  policy  tilts  compara-  from several sources.  One is quantification in studies
tive  advantage  to  (1)  established  family  farms,  (2)  using  deterministic  rather  than  behavioral  models  of
renters,  including  part  owners,  (3)  corporate  indus-  typical  farm firms under various tax policy and infla-
trial-conglomerate  farms,  and  (4)  part-time small  tion scenarios (Boehlje; Davenport, et al.; Eginton). If
farms. The  gains in these categories  are associated  with  individuals act rationally to increase after-tax income,
a decline in entry-level full-time  family farms-which  these models  help  to predict  actual  outcomes.  Also,
eventually  means  fewer  full-time  family  size  farms.  actual observed movement of the farming economy in
Land  ownership  and  operation  will  be  increasingly  the direction predicted herein provides at least circum-
separated,  with ownership tilting toward  nonfarm  ab-  stantial  evidence in support for the conclusions  of this
sentee landlords and corporate stockholders.  Unfavor-  analysis.
able  fiscal-monetary  policy  also  appears  to  increase  I  have elsewhere  (Tweeten  1981a) detailed  needed
capital-labor ratios and possibly investment,  while re-  changes  in federal policy to restore economic  vigor with
ducing overall  economic efficiency.  price  stability.  Space  limitations  here  preclude  spell-
High  real  interest  rates  and  a  depressed  economy  ing out such a policy,  but important elements include
promoted  by expansionary  fiscal  policy  and  tight  (1) internationally coordinated  fiscal-monetary policy,
money policy  in  the early  1980s  may have  been the  (2)  decisive action  to ensure  a more  nearly balanced
worst of all environments  for the mid-size  family farm,  post-recession  federal  budget,  and  (3)  restructuring  the
but favorable fiscal-monetary  policy is also no unmit-  economy  to create resiliency  and reduce the natural rate
igated boon  to farm structure.  The two major  factors  of unemployment through a wage supplement and an-
determining  farm size  are personal  income and  tech-  titrust legislation applied to organized labor.
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